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Abstract— Similarity search in high dimensional space
database is split into two worlds: i) fast, scalable, and approx-
imate search algorithms which are not secure, and ii) search
protocols based on secure computation which are not scalable.
This paper presents a one-way privacy protocol that lies in
between these two worlds. Approximate metrics for the cosine
similarity allows speed. Elements of large random matrix theory
provides security evidences if the size of the database is not too
big with respect to the space dimension.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quickly identifying in a very large database the elements
that are the most similar to a given query is a central need for
many applications. While this has been solved many years ago
for traditional relational databases, similarity search in high-
dimensional space is still challenging. During the last decade,
the quest for scalability was paramount. This is particularly
difficult because the curse of dimensionality severely hurts
the performance of retrieval algorithms. The most efficient
solutions run approximate searches, where efficiency is traded-
off against a reduction of the search quality. State-of-the-
art retrieval techniques now cope with databases comprising
millions to billions elements, return answers very fast, and the
quality of the results is appropriate in most applications.
A. The need for security and privacy
Recently, other challenges have raised in this field: security
and privacy. This is today critical as the trend is to outsource
to a third party data, processing or both. Outsourcing is
beneficial as one might not have enough storage capacity
and/or computing power and/or the capacity to enforce 24×7
availability of services. But it raises security and privacy
problems. Typically, the Owner of the database subcontracts
the search task to a Server. This actor is not fully trusted, more
specifically it is assumed to be honest but curious: It may infer
information about the database or the queries of the Client.
Outsourcing challenges biometric identification. The main
axiom in biometric claims that no database can be stored
securely [11]. Therefore, the Server cannot store the database
of biometric templates in the clear (i.e. not protected) since
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a pirate would steal these highly sensitive data. In the same
way, the User is reluctant in sending biometric template query
in the clear. Similarity search is also the cornerstone of some
classification algorithms. A class is associated to each vector
of the database, and the goal is to predict the class of the query
vector from the class of its most similar vectors in the database.
The Owner does not want to share his database as this is the
fruit of his know-how in collecting and assessing the quality of
these data. The Client is interested in the prediction value but
does not want to disclose his query vector for some privacy
issues. This happens in applications such as medical diagnostic
(vectors are features extracted from medical records) or user
recommendation system (vectors are user profiles).
B. The past approaches
Security and privacy in similarity search has become a hot
topic in the field of information security. A special issue
of the IEEE Signal Processing Magazine has been recently
published [1]. It is striking that all its articles propose solu-
tions based on homomorphic cryptography (mostly with the
Pallier cryptosystem). An even more recent article pushes
this state-of-the-art further using Gentry’s fully homomorphic
cryptosystem [11]. This common approach has been coined
‘Signal processing in the encrypted domain’: The encrypted
similarity metric is computed from encrypted vectors, so that
the Server neither sees the data nor their similarities. The
security and privacy inherit from the computational security
of these cryptosystems. They are semantically secure in the
sense that nothing about the plaintext, be it vector or metric,
can be inferred from the ciphertext. They are also robust to
known plaintext attacks: The secret key cannot be disclosed
when the attacker observes pairs of plaintext / ciphertext.
C. Our contributions
Our approach is motivated by the facts that encryption,
homomorphic operations, and decryption are time-consuming.
Ciphertexts are also big and consume a lot of storage and
bandwidth. Some efforts have been made to combat these
pitfalls. However, computation runtime and bandwidth remain
bigger by several orders of magnitude than the state-of-the-art
approximate similarity search when security is not enforced.
So far, the trade-off between security and scalability seems
to be exclusive: Solutions are either very secure or very
scalable. This paper aims at designing a solution striking
a softer trade-off. Our keystone idea is to enforce security
with signal processing tools. We also resort to cryptography,
but only to symmetric encryption, which is much faster than
homomorphic schemes. Our strategy is to start from a scalable
search algorithm and to modify it to gain security. This is
achieved by requiring more complexity on the Client side, but
far less than protocols based on homomorphic encryption do.
We stress three main contributions:
• Approximated metrics enabling a fast search dedicated to
the cosine similarity (Section II-B);
• A protocol enabling both one-way privacy / security and
speed (Section III);
• A security assessment based on theoretical elements of
statistics of high dimensional signals, and especially the
Marcenko-Pastur distribution of the eigenvalues of the
empirical covariance matrix (Section IV).
Our previous work [10] complied with this approach. Yet,
it dealt with fast search with the Euclidean distance, and the
exposed solution was secure in the ‘honest but curious’ model
but not against Known Plaintext Attack. This weakness no
longer exists in our new scheme provided the database is not
too big (see Sect. VI-D).
D. The framework
The framework involves three actors: The Owner, The
Server and the Client. The Owner has a set of feature vectors
X = {xn}Nn=1 and a set of metadata M = {mn}Nn=1. The
metadata mn associated to xn can be its index n, the value
of xn, some label (in classification application), or the ID
of the content/individual from which xn has been extracted,
etc. The Owner subcontracts the search to the Server. For this
purpose, he prepares offline a database D. For privacy and
security issues, this database shall not contain the vectors in
the clear. The Client has a query vector q and he is interested
in the metadata of the most similar vectors in X . The Client
is trusted either because the application only requires one-way
privacy as in [7], either by assumption like in [11].
II. FAST AND APPROXIMATE SIMILARITY SEARCH
Our approach applies to a family of approximate similarity
searches, not to only one specific technique. We describe this
family in rather abstract terms now, yet sufficiently detailed to
understand how it can be made more secure and private in the
sequel. This description covers for instance Locally Sensitive
Hashing [8], [4], [5], and variants [6], [3], as well as product
quantization [9]. Security is not considered in this section.
A. A family of approximate similarity search
The indexing strategies that belong to this family all start
with assuming description features lying in Rd and a similarity
metric sim(q,x) used to compare these features. This is
typically a decreasing function of the Euclidean distance or
a normalized correlation, q is the query and x one of the
(millions to billions) database vectors.
Comparing these features in the original data space is costly,
as distances are calculated over a gigantic number of features.
The approximate search strategies we describe here trade
response time and memory footprint for accuracy. These tech-
niques turn original vectors into very compact signatures and
turn their original similarity criterion into a fast approximation
computed over their compact representations. Of course, care
is taken to preserve the quality of the approximated searches
compared to searching the original data.
The general principles this family of techniques adheres to
are the following. The original features are first embedded
into another space of a different dimensionality Rm. The
embedding is done by projecting the vectors against a random
d × m matrix Π: pi = Π⊤x. The resulting projections are
then split into L subvectors, each of size P (for simplicity
we assume m = P × L, L and P being integers): pi =
(pi⊤1 , . . . ,pi
⊤
L )
⊤.
Each subvector piℓ is then quantized into Q symbols,
giving sΠ,x(ℓ) the ℓ-th symbol of the signature. The compact
signature lies therefore in the space {1, . . . , Q}L, compactly
encoded using L×⌈log2Q⌉ bits. The codebook for quantizing
each subvector might depend on ℓ.
Two similarity metrics are used to compare the signatures
in the database to the query. The symmetric approximated
similarity compares two signatures as follows:
sims(q,x) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Ts,ℓ(sΠ,q(ℓ), sΠ,x(ℓ)), (1)
where Ts,ℓ is a Q × Q matrix storing the typical similarity
amounts between vectors falling in all pairs of quantization
cells. This is of course a rather rough estimate of the true
similarities, but tabulation makes it extremely fast.
The other possible metric is in contrast asymmetric [6], [9]
as the similarity is established by comparing the signatures
in the database and the projection piq = Π
⊤q of the query,
split into L subvectors (pi⊤q,1, . . . ,pi
⊤
q,L)
⊤. The asymmetric
approximated similarity is then
sima(q,x) =
L∑
ℓ=1
fℓ(piq,ℓ, sΠ,x(ℓ)). (2)
It is efficiently computed for a large number of signatures
thanks to L × Q matrix Ta: Ta(ℓ, u) = fℓ(piq,ℓ, u), so that
sima(q,x) =
∑L
ℓ=1Ta(ℓ, sΠ,x(ℓ)).
B. A particular approximated similarity search
We instantiate this general description into a particular
scheme suitable for the cosine similarity:
sim(q,x) = q⊤x/(‖q‖‖x‖). (3)
We project the normalized version of x: pi = Π⊤x/‖x‖. Then,
each subvector piℓ is quantized onto a set of Q predefined
directions of the space RP . They are represented by P
dimensional vectors {vu}Qu=1 s.t. ‖vu‖ = cst, ∀u:
sΠ,x(ℓ) = arg max
1≤u≤Q
pi
⊤
ℓ vu. (4)
We aim at constructing the vectors such that they are uniformly
distributed over the unit sphere of RP . Section VI-A details
how we almost achieve this for the special case P = 8.
Geometrically, the projection vector piℓ lies inside the single
hypercone of axis vsΠ,x(ℓ) and angle θ. Indeed, this is not true:
the ‘quantization cell’ associated to vu contains the hypercone
of axis vu and angle θ = arccos(maxu′ 6=u v⊤u vu′)/2.
We advice the following tables for computing the metrics:
Ts,ℓ(u1, u2) = v
⊤
u1 .vu2 , ∀(u1, u2) ∈ {1, . . . , Q}2 (5)
Ta(ℓ, u) = pi
⊤
q,ℓ.vj , ∀(ℓ, u) ∈ {1, . . . , L} × {1, . . . , Q}.(6)
The protocol of Section III is based on these approximated
metrics with some mild changes for security reason.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
We present a protocol based on the signature and the
approximated similarities presented in Section. II-B.
A. Main structure
The main idea underlying the protocol is simple. The Client
sends the signature of the query to the Server, which makes a
fast but rough approximated similarity search. This results in
a shortlist of candidates sent back to the Client, who makes a
second and more refined similarity search. In scalable search
literature, the Server usually performs this double step search.
Here, the Client processes the second step as it involves
confidential information about the query.
The first step is scalable (able to cope with billions of
entries) but provides a crude search. What matters here is the
speed for computing the approximated similarities, and the
size RS of the shortlist so that the most similar vectors are
almost surely in, even if they are not ranked first.
In the second step, the computation of the similarities
is slower, which is less important since only RS ≪ N
candidates remain. What matters here is the recall at rank
R ≤ RS , denoted by ‘l-recall@R’. This is the average ratio
of the number of true l-most similar vectors among the R
first returned vectors over l. As usual in approximate search
literature, we focus on the 1-recall@R, which is the probability
that the most similar entry is in the first R returned vectors.
B. Offline preparation of the Owner
The protocol starts as follows. Offline, the Owner processes
the vectors of X together with the set of metadata M to
prepare the database D to be given to the Server. We constrain
the construction of the set {vu}Qu=1 to contain antipodal
vectors: Q is even and the vectors can be grouped into Q/2
pairs such that v2j = −v2j−1, ∀j ≤ Q/2. The Owner first
draws a set of K secret matrices {Π(k)}Kk=1 and also a secret
key sk for a symmetric cryptosystem, like AES.
The signature of xn with Π
(k) is slightly different than (4):
s′Πk,xn(ℓ) =
⌊
sΠk,xn(ℓ) + 1
2
⌋
∀ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L. (7)
This symbol pertains to {1, . . . , Q/2}. The quantization cell
is the two nappes hypercone of axis v2∗s′
Πk,xn
(ℓ) (or equiv-
alently v2∗s′
Πk,xn
(ℓ)−1). This signature is encoded with L ×
⌈log2(Q/2)⌉ bits. In addition, the Owner computes the fol-
lowing side information:
s′′Πk,xn(ℓ) = mod (sΠk,xn(ℓ), 2) ∀ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L. (8)
This bit indicates in which single nappe hypercone the pro-
jection belongs to: pi⊤xn,ℓ.v2∗s′Πk,xn (ℓ)−s
′′
Πk,xn
(ℓ) ≥ 0. Finally,
the Owner appends the following information into an entry of
database D: [s′Πk,xn , encsk([k, s′′Πk,xn ,mn])], where encsk(·)
is the encryption with secret key sk and [a, b] is the con-
catenation of strings a and b. In other words, the Server has
access to the compact representation s′Πk,xn , but not the side-
information pieces k, s′′Πk,xn and mn.
These K.N entries are shuffled before sending D to the
Server such that this latter has no clue on the indices n and k
that produced a given entry. The Owner also sends the Server
the Q/2×Q/2 matrix Ts necessary to compute the symmetric
approximated similarity (1):
Ts(u1, u2) = |v⊤2∗u1 .v2∗u2 |. (9)
Note that the vectors of X , the secret matrices {Πk}Kk=1, and
the secret key sk are not disclosed to the Server.
C. Approximated search at the Server side
Online, the Client follows the same process. For one query
vector q, a ‘bag’ of K signatures {s′Πk,q}Kk=1 are computed
and sent to the Server. However, there is no specific order in
the bag, so that the Server does not know which secret key
has generated which signature inside the bag.
The Server proceeds the symmetric approximated search
for all signatures in the query bag over all the signatures
in the dataset. This has a complexity of O(K2.N.L). The
Server gives back K shortlists of size RS , one per sig-
nature in the query bag respecting the order found in the
bag. Each element of a shortlist is a full entry of D, i.e.
[s′Πk,xn , encsk([k, s
′′
Πk,xn
,mn])].
D. Approximated search at the Client side
The Client receives a shortlist per signature in the query
bag. The Client knows which secret matrices Πk generated
the query signature giving birth to a given shortlist. For a
given k, he decrypts the side-information in the corresponding
shortlist and prunes out any entry based on another secret
key: This is a false positive, as it is a match between
two signatures computed with different secret matrices. For
the remaining vectors, the Client computes the asymmetric
approximated similarity (2) via (6). This is possible thanks
to the side-information s′′Πk,xn . When all the shortlists have
been processed, the Client sorts in decreasing order all the
approximated similarities to obtain the final ranking.
IV. A PRIMER ON STATISTICAL SIGNAL PROCESSING OVER
LARGE RANDOM MATRICES
We introduce some theoretical elements on statistics of large
random matrices. This section is somehow disconnected from
the previous ones, but it will be the foundation of the security
assessments of our protocol in Sect. V.
A. The ‘Information plus Noise’ model
Suppose we observe No signals in R
d in the form xn =
A.sn + nn, where A = (a1, . . . ,aK) is a fixed but unknown
with a limited rank K ≪ d matrix whose columns have
unit norm, sn ∈ RK are random source signals mutually
independent with power ρ > 0, and nn ∈ Rd is a white noise
of unit variance, not necessary Gaussian distributed. This setup
is often called the ‘Information plus Noise’ model. Let stack
the observations in one matrix, XNo = (x1, . . . ,xNo), and as
for the noise NNo = (n1, . . . ,nNo). A well known estimator
of A is to proceed a PCA, which amounts to make the SVD of
the empirical covariance matrix RˆNo = XNo .X
⊤
No
/No. This
works because, for a fixed d, RˆNo converges as No →∞ to
the true covariance matrix ρAA⊤ + Id. (d−K) eigenvalues
equals 1, andK others 1+ρ, so that the eigenvectors associated
to the biggest eigenvalues reveal the K-dimensional subspace
spanned by the columns of A.
In practice, this may totally fail if No is not much bigger
than d. This has been studied with the following theoretical
model: K is fixed while d = c.No (c < 1) with No →∞. Let
us first focus on the ‘Noise’ component. A surprising result is
that its empirical covariance matrix NNoN
⊤
No
/No no longer
converges towards Id as No → ∞. Indeed, the eigenvalues
of NNoN
⊤
No
/No are random variables whose law is known
as the Marcenko-Pastur distribution defined over the interval
[(1−√c)2, (1 +√c)2].
B. Indetectability of the eigenvalues
This may have a huge impact on PCA based detector or
estimator. A first result from [2] states that if ρ >
√
c, it
is possible to estimate the eigenvalues of AA⊤ from the K
biggest eigenvalues of RˆNo . But, if this condition is not met,
the eigenvalues related to the ‘Information’ part remain hidden
among the eigenvalues due the ‘Noise’ part. For instance, [2]
showed that even the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test cannot
make the distinction between ‘Noise’ only (i.e. ρ = 0) and
‘Information plus Noise’ (0 < ρ <
√
c) observations.
C. Unreliable estimation by the eigenvectors
Even if ρ >
√
c, a further difficulty raises in the estimation
of the subspace spanned by the columns of A. Even for the
simple case where K = 1 (i.e. A = a1), [12] shows that the
eigenvector aˆ1 associated to the largest eigenvalue of RˆNo
is a bad estimator because κ = a⊤1 aˆ1 →
√
1−c/ρ
1+c/ρ < 1 as
No → ∞. In other words, since its norm is one, the true
vector a1 lies in the intersection of the unit sphere and the
hyperplan x⊤aˆ1 = κ. In a high dimensional space, this makes
a big ambiguity whenever κ cannot go to 1.
V. SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
When subcontracting the search to the Server, the Owner
may have two worries: i) the Server might guess the most
similar vector to a given entry of the database or to the query
signature, ii) the Server can reconstruct either the query or the
vectors from their signatures.
A. Guessing the most similar vector
The first threat pertains to the honest but curious model.
Knowing D, the Server can infer which vectors are more
similar than others. This threat is absolutely impossible in
the past approaches based on heavy cryptographic primitives
because these encryption schemes are semantically secure. Yet,
in our system, this threat is mitigated since the metadata (the
value of importance) associated to each vector are encrypted.
The Server doesn’t know sk as the ‘honest but curious’ model
excludes any collusion between Client and Server.
Yet, the Server can still guess the most similar vector based
on the signatures s′Πk,xn . Starting from one entry of D or the
query signature, the symmetric approximated similarity of (1)
yields a list of most similar vectors. There is no need of the
secret matrices, the knowledge of Ts defined in (9) is enough.
Yet, since the signatures are computed with different secret
matrices, plenty of false positives indeed spoil the quality
of the search. The feasibility of this attack is gauged by
the 1-recall@R obtained with the symmetric approximated
similarity. Fig. 1 shows that this performs much worse than
the similarity search at the Client side.
B. Reconstruction of the vectors
The second threat is possible if the projection matrix is
disclosed via the following equation:
xˆ = Π†k
(
v⊤sΠk,x(1), . . . ,v
⊤
sΠk,x(L)
)⊤
, (10)
where Π† is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of Π. This
reconstruction is lossy due to the quantization process.
This threat is impossible in the honest but curious model
since the Server does not know any of the secret matrices.
However, the literature often extends this model and argues
that the usual homomorphic encryption schemes are secure
under a Known Plaintext Attack. In our context, this translates
into the following requirement: even if the Server could
observe N tuples {(xn, {s′Πk,xn}k)}Nn=1, he should not be
able to disclose any secret matrix Πk. Note that the Server
observes vectors, not their quantized version.
The idea is the following. The curious Server chooses two
integers 1 ≤ u ≤ Q/2 and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L and makes the following
group: Xu,ℓ = {xn|∃k, s′Πk,xn(ℓ) = u}. These vectors in Rd
share the property of being strongly oriented along the direc-
tion ±Π(ℓ)1 v2u, and/or ±Π(ℓ)2 v2u, ..., and/or ±Π(ℓ)K v2u. This
means that more power lies in the K-dimensional subspace
Su,ℓ spanned by (Π(ℓ)1 vu, . . . ,Π(ℓ)K vu), and this should be
noticeable in their covariance matrix.
This is where the theoretical elements of Section IV come
into the picture. In expectation, the number of useful obser-
vations over all X , i.e. the size of set Xu,ℓ, equals No(K) =
N(1−(1−P1)K), where P1 is the probability that s′Πk,xn(ℓ) =
u for a given k. Section IV tells that a first factor of utmost
importance is the ratio c = d/No(K). The second factor of
importance is the power ρK of the equivalent ‘Information’
part. The annex shows that asK increases, this power vanishes
(see (16)). It remains to fine-tune a setup, and especially the
parameter K, enforcing ρK <
√
d/No(K). This assesses
that the disclosure of the subspace Su,ℓ is impossible, and
consequently the secret matrices {Πk}Kk=1.
The initial assumption was that the Server knows no more
than N vectors and their bag of signatures. This holds if the
secret matrices encode only one set X of size N . The security
of our protocol is deeply related to the size of the database.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL PROOF OF CONCEPT
A. Implementation details
We present which {vu}Qu=1 we choose and how we quantize
the direction of subvectors. To do so efficiently, we set P = 8,
and we quantize piℓ/‖piℓ‖ to the nearest point of the E8 lattice.
It appears that any point on the sphere of radius 1 is quantized
onto one of the 240 points of the first shell of the lattice
E8. These are the lattice points whose norm equal
√
2. By
doing so, we take advantage of the fast quantization algorithm
onto lattice E8. These vectors make angles with each other of
values {0, π/3, π/2, 2π/3, π}. Any subvector making an angle
smaller that π/6 with vu is then quantized to this lattice point.
B. Runtime and communication payload
The setup is as follows: X is composed of N = 50, 000
white Gaussian vectors of dimension d = 256. There are
Nq = 400 queries. The size of the shortlists is RS = 200.
The default parameters are set to (L,P,K) = (512, 8, 8)
(unless explicitly stated). Runtimes are given for a Matlab
implementation running on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core i7 platform
(single thread). The Server returns the shortlists within 2.0
sec. The Client re-ranks the relevant vectors within 0.07 sec.
As for the payload of the communication, querying costs 3.6
KB (the size of a signature) whereas returning the shortlists
amounts to 820 KB. These orders of magnitude are in between
those reported with similar environment in the literature of
• secure computation: for a signature of 1.5 KB, the secure
computation of a single similarity (1 vs. 1) takes 60 s and
393 MB of communication [11, Tab. III].
• fast similarity search: for a signature of 8B, the search 1
vs. 106 takes 40 ms (1-recall@100=0.65) [9, Tab. V].
C. Client vs. curious Server performances
Fig. 1 shows the huge gap between the quality of the
approximate search at the Client and (curious) Server sides.
The 1-recall@R of the Client is limited by the probability
that the most similar vector pertains to the shortlists. This
limit is reached around R = 20 proving the re-ranking is very
powerful thanks to the asymmetric approximated search. At
the Server side, the median of the rank of the most similar
vector is 600 for long signatures (L = 512), and bigger than
103 for short signatures (L = 384). In other words, the Server
has almost no clue of which vector the Client is looking for,
and this enables the one-way privacy of the search.
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Fig. 1. Client (plain) and the curious Server’s (dashed) 1-recall@R.
TABLE I
POWER OF THE ‘INFORMATION’ PART AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
VECTORS IN THE DATABASE PER DIMENSION. P = 8, θ = pi/6.
K 6 7 8 9 10
ρK 0.91 0.78 0.68 0.61 0.55
Nlim(K)/d 159 186 212 239 265
D. Security assessment
The numerical application of (14) (see Appendix I-A) with
P = 8, θ = π/6 and K = 1 gives a power of ‘Information’
part of ρ1 ≈ 5.43, which is not lower than c < 1. We need at
least K = 6 secret matrices (see Table I) to dilute this power
s.t. ρK < 1 (see (16)). Then, the ‘Information’ part can be
hidden into the ‘Noise’ if ρK <
√
d/No(K). This in turn
proves security if these secret matrices are used for only one
database whose size is smaller than Nlim(K):
Nlim(K) =
d
ρ2K(1− (1− P1)K)
. (11)
Fig. 2 illustrates this statistical phenomenon with one database
size lower than Nlim(K) and the other infringing this limit.
In the latter case, the Marcenko-Pastur interval is smaller and
the eigenvalues of the ‘Noise’ do not hide those related to the
‘Information’. The distribution of eigenvalues of the empirical
covariance matrix significantly differs from the Marcenko-
Pastur distribution. Table I shows that Nlim(K) increases with
K. Yet, this is limited by the fact that Sec. IV assumedK ≪ d.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a protocol for similarity search in high-
dimensional space striking a trade-off between speed and
security. The assumption is that the Client is trusted and the
Owner outsources the search to a honest but curious Server.
The security against Known Plaintext Attack and one-way
privacy assessments are based on statistical considerations.
The protocol is much faster and consumes far less bandwidth
than solutions based on homomorphic cryptography. However,
security has a prize to pay: It restricts the size of the database
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Fig. 2. Empirical density distribution of the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix of x ∈ Xq,ℓ vs. the Marcenko-Pastur p.d.f. (red). In green, the
eigenvalues due to the ‘Information’ are isolated because N > Nlim(K).
and precludes the scalability to be as large as current state-of-
the-art in fast (but unsecure) similarity search. The protocol
cannot resist a Chosen Plaintext Attack.
APPENDIX I
A. Power distribution with one hypercone
Let us study a mathematical model x = Πpi + Π⊥pi⊥,
where (Π,Π⊥) forms a basis of Rd, whose P first vectors are
gathered in Π. We suppose that x is distributed as a Gaussian
white noirse, therefore so are pi and pi⊥ in their subspace.
The probability P1 that pi lies in the two nappes hypercone
C(v, θ) of axis v and angle θ equals:
P1 = P(pi ∈ C(v, θ)) = 1− Icos2(θ)(1/2, (P − 1)/2)), (12)
where I(·) is the regularized incomplete beta function.
We now compute the covariance matrix of x knowing that
pi ∈ C(v, θ) ⊂ RP . This is modeled by pi = a.v/‖v‖ + n
with v⊤n = 0 and a2 > ‖n‖2/ tan2(θ). While a is distributed
as N (0, 1) (density f(·)), ‖n‖2 is χ2P−1 distributed (density
g(·)). In RP , denote the power along the direction v by λ¯1.
We have λ¯1 = E(a
2) with:
E(a2) =
(∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
√
n/ tan(θ)
a2f(a)g(n) dadn
)
/P1. (13)
An integration by parts gives λ¯1 = 1 + ρ1 with
ρ1 =
tan−1(θ)
(1 + tan−2(θ))
P
2
Γ
(
P
2
)
√
πΓ
(
P−1
2
)P−11 . (14)
Denote the power along a direction orthogonal to v by λ1:
λ1 = 1−
P1
1− P1 λ¯1 = 1−
P1
1− P1 (1 + ρ1). (15)
Mapping back to Rd, vector x whose projection pi ∈ C(v, θ)
has a covariance matrix with one eigenvalue equaling λ¯1, (P−
1) eigenvalues λ1, and (d− P ) unit eigenvalues set to 1.
B. Power distribution with K hypercones
Suppose that x ∈ Rd is such that there exists at least one
matrix Πk (over a set of K) giving Π
⊤
k x ∈ C(v, θ). This
happens with a probability PK = 1 − (1− P1)K ≈ KP1 for
small P1. We suppose that Π
⊤
k1 .Πk2 = δk1(k2)IP , which is
feasible if KP ≤ d. (Π1, . . . ,ΠK ,Π′⊥) is then a base of Rd.
For a fixed k, such a vector x has a projection Π⊤k x ∈ C(v, θ)
with probability P1/PK , and its power along direction Πkv
equals: λ¯K = λ¯1P1P
−1
K + (1− P1P−1K ) = 1 + ρK , with
ρK = ρ
P1
PK
≈ ρ
K
. (16)
By the same token, for any vector v⊥ ∈ RP s.t. v⊤v⊥ = 0,
the power along the direction Πkv
⊥ follows:
λK = 1−
P 21 (1 + ρ)
PK(1− P1) ≈ 1−K
−1 P1
1− P1 (1 + ρ). (17)
In the end, the covariance matrix of such vector x has K
eigenvalues equalling λ¯K , (P − 1)K eigenvalues λK , and
(d−KP ) unit eigenvalues. Eq. (16) and (17) show that as K
increases, (λK , λ¯K) are closer to 1. Therefore, they become
hidden into the Marcenko-Pastur interval when the number of
observations is not big compared to d.
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